Conflict in environmental governance is common, and bringing together stakeholders with diverse perspectives in situations of conflict is extremely difficult. However, case studies of how diverse stakeholders form self-organized coalitions under these circumstances exist and provide invaluable opportunities to understand the causal mechanisms that operate in the process. We focus on the case of the Georgian Bay Biosphere Reserve nomination process, which unfolded over several years and moved the region from a series of serious conflicts to one where stakeholders came together to support a Biosphere Reserve nomination. Causal mechanisms identified from the literature and considered most relevant to the case were confirmed in it, using an 'explaining outcomes' process tracing methodology. Perceived severity of the problem, institutional emulation, and institutional entrepreneurship all played an important role in the coalition-building process. The fear of marginalization was identified as a potential causal mechanism that requires further study. The findings here contribute to filling an important gap in the literature related to causal mechanisms for self-organized coalition-building under conflict, and contribute to practice with important considerations when building a coalition for natural resource management and governance.
Introduction
Collaboration is a common rallying cry when making decisions about environmental and natural resources. Collaborative approaches which bring together a range of stakeholders in an iterative process of learning and doing are hypothesized to more effectively address system complexity, change, and uncertainty (Folke et al. 2002 (Folke et al. , 2005 Armitage et al. 2009; Butler et al. 2015) . However, bringing together diverse stakeholders when there are situations of conflict (e.g., over resource access, use) can be difficult (Bodin 2017) . There are many approaches to conflict resolution, or 'making collaboration work', in a variety of natural resource management and governance contexts (e.g., Buckles 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Daniels and Walker 2001; Butler et al. 2015 ), yet there is a dearth of research related to how stakeholders move beyond conflict to self-organize and form coalitions for collective action in voluntary natural resource management and governance initiatives. Accordingly, this research seeks to answer the following question: What are the causal mechanisms in a case of self-organization under conflict that result in a coalition for collective action? We use a process tracing methodology and draw from multiple fields of study to identify these causal mechanisms in a case study where a coalition was built around a voluntary initiative to pursue a Biosphere Reserve designation. The findings from this research identify and bring together a suite of causal mechanisms that may have relevance in a large number of self-organized collective action arrangements for natural resource management and governance that, until now, have been discussed in isolation, or not at all.
Factors that Influence Self-organization for Coalition Building in the Face of Conflict
We define conflict here as a "dynamic process that occurs between interdependent parties as they experience negative emotional reactions to perceived disagreements and interference with the attainment of their goals" (Barki and Hartwick 2004: 234) . Conflict may arise from a range of circumstances. It may occur as the result of differences in knowledge, understanding beliefs and/or values that are used by stakeholders to frame a resource management problem (i.e., cognitive conflict) (Adams et al. 2003; . Conflict can result from changing availability of natural resources. Conflict has also been documented to result from social, legal, economic and/or cultural arrangements (Steins and Edwards 1999; ). Longstanding and/or escalating conflicts may develop among stakeholders and finding common ground can be difficult (Butler et al. 2015) .
Despite sometimes deep-seated conflict, individuals and groups do come together to make decisions about their shared natural resources. This occurs in institutionalized, mandated situations where specific actor groups are required to be represented (e.g., source water protection in Ontario, Canada (Baird et al. 2014) ), the Northwest Power and Conservation Council's Fish and Wildlife Program in the United States (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Ansell and Gash 2008) , but can also occur as the result of selforganization (e.g., California's program for water management [CALFED] (Booher and Innes 2010) and the Kristianstads Vattenrike Biosphere Reserve in Sweden (Olsson et al. 2004; Lebel et al. 2006) . "Loosely structured governance entities" that emerge as a result of self-organization may influence interaction norms, agendas and contexts within which decisions are made and resources are accessed (Folke et al. 2005, p. 449; Lebel et al. 2006) . These governance entities may be considered cases of collective action, which is defined as actions taken by a group that are sustained over time and that includes decision-making structures and rules (Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999; Olson 2002) . Steins and Edwards (1999) usefully point out that there is interplay between actor interests in furthering the collective interest of the group and individual interests through voluntary cooperation, and that the shape of collective action is dependent on the circumstances.
One important way that actors self-organize to collectively govern natural resources is through coalitions for collective action ('coalition' hereafter) . We use the definition of coalitions offered by Flanigan et al. (2006) of loose organization of supporters of a cause, where self-organizing mechanisms are predominant, and coordination and control are minimal. Once formed, a coalition may act a precursor to collaboration. Coalitions can form in a range of configurations, including: as a sub-group within a larger organization (e.g. Häge 2013) ; as a cooperating group of organizations (e.g., nations, as in Hurrell 1992) ; or, as a group of individual actors (Zakocs and Edwards 2006) . Coalitions operate within a structure-agency dilemma where actors interact (including form alliances and cooperate) within the constraints of the existing structures, but also act upon and restructure these structures. Thus, while the existing structures constrain interactions, they also enable or provide stability for these interactions (Geels 2004) . Although actors may be a part of the same group (or coalition), they will have different preferences, interests and employ different strategies, and these "are not fixed but rather change over time as a result of social action" (Geels 2004, p. 907) . Thus, we cannot assume that all actors join the coalition for the same reasons or have the same belief systems. However, they typically support a common agenda or purpose.
The causal mechanisms for moving from conflict to collective action among actors in conflict for the purposes of natural resource management and governance are not well developed in the literature. Variables important for self-organized collective action have been identified (see Agrawal 2001 , Ostrom 2009 , and many of these variables are relevant in the context of conflicts among actors. However, variables are largely presented in terms of the functioning or sustainability of collective action arrangements (e.g., Agrawal 2001), rather than factors leading to arrangements (although Agrawal [2001] acknowledges there are complex relationships among them). Explicit linkages among these variables as causal mechanisms to collective action have not been developed but have been called for (Agrawal 2001 ; with the exception of a large-N study by Agrawal and Chhatre [2006] ).
As a result of the absence of studies of causal mechanisms, we engaged in an iterative process of identifying variables relevant to our case study. We first drew upon related ideas (i.e., reasons for engaging in collective action) in the natural resource management and governance literature. Within it, we draw specifically on well-established works that identify reasons actors engage in self-organization and the conditions under which it is most likely to occur (Schlager 2004; Ostrom 2007; Lubell et al. 2002 , with the assumption that most self-organization in common pool resource systems, such as the case under study, occurs in the context of some degree of conflict.
The literature offers a wealth of variables for investigating questions related to collective action in natural resource management and governance and reflects the wide range of factors and conditions identified by scholars in this area. Specifically, the variables draw attention to resources, institutions and actors that may be useful in setting the stage for explaining the conflict and explaining other outcomes in collective action (Lubell et al. 2002; Schlager 2004; Sabatier et al. 2005; Ostrom 2007 ). For example, the perceived severity of the problem (Lubell et al. 2002) and leadership/ entrepreneurship (Ostrom 2007 ) are two variables that make self-organization for collective action more likely. The full range of variables in the works identified above were considered in terms of their relevance to the case but describing all of them here is beyond the scope of the case study. Therefore, after careful review, we focus only those that were most relevant to the case in the following section.
The perceived severity of the problem and leadership/ entrepreneurship variables, while important and potentially applicable to the case, were deemed inadequate to address the research question fully after an initial review of the case study evidence (full explanation of methods follows). As a result, we drew upon causal mechanisms from the related fields of policy change and social innovation. There are many examples, including policy emulation, policy transfer, policy diffusion, policy entrepreneurs/institutional entrepreneurs, and fear of marginalization (Moore and Westley 2011; Mintrom 1997; Karch 2007; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Häge 2013) . These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, rather it is likely that more than one mechanism functions to induce policy change (Beach and Pedersen 2013; e.g., Dolowitz and Marsh 1996) . Here, we focus on policy emulation, policy/institutional entrepreneurs and fear of marginalization, as, after reviewing a suite of mechanisms, these are most relevant to the case. While the context of this study is not one of policy change per se, it reflects a change in governance and thus holds connections to that literature, and connections between these fields have been made by other scholars (e.g., Heikkila and Gerlak 2005) . We do believe the case represents a social innovation, as defined by Mulgan et al. (2006) as "new ideas that work in meeting social goals". While we acknowledge that the Biosphere Reserve concept is not new-it has been implemented in hundreds of sites around the world-it is the application of this concept in the unique context of Georgian Bay that is novel and represents a "scaling out" of the innovation (Moore and Westley 2011) .
Ultimately, we identified and investigated in detail four potential mechanisms that hold the greatest relevance to the specific case study: perceived severity of the problem, emulation, entrepreneurs, and the fear of marginalization. They come from the fields of collective action for natural resource management and governance, policy change, and social innovation. These causal mechanisms not only aid in understanding and explaining coalition-building for collective action under conflict in the case, but also contribute to the collective action and collaboration literatures, addressing a gap in understanding the causal mechanisms that spur collective action. Each is described in more detail in the following section.
Potential Causal Mechanisms
Perceived severity of the problem
The perceived severity of the problem has been posited as a feature of a situation that results in a greater likelihood for collective action (Lubell et al. 2002; Sabatier et al. 2005) . Lubell et al. (2002) explain that, as environmental problems increase in severity, the benefits from engaging in collective action increase (i.e., that actors engage in cost-benefit analysis ). We believe it represents a potential cause for engaging in self-organized coalition-building ( Table 1 ). The severity of the problem is described in the literature in terms of a series of measures, including direct measures of environmental quality, potential for diffuse damage from multiple sources (e.g., non-point source pollution of water bodies), potential for direct damage from known sources, and population pressure (Lubell et al. 2002) . Related to this condition for collective action are Schlager's (2004) insights that there is a perception that improvement is possible (that is, conditions have not deteriorated to such an extent that there is little advantage to organizing) and that the problem is salient to those organizing.
Emulation
Emulation is described as a process in which knowledge about administrative arrangements, institutions, or policies in one place/time is used in the development of them in another place/time (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; De Jong et al. 2002) (Table 1 ). This process can be voluntary or coercive and for the purposes of this study we focus on voluntary emulation. Two catalysts of voluntary emulation are dissatisfaction with the status quo (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996) and the perceived success of the particular arrangement by others (Karch 2007) . It may also be driven by similarities between the two places in terms of ideology, demography and economics (Karch 2007; Kroesen et al. 2007) . Policy emulation shares some common characteristics with policy diffusion, however, diffusion refers to the successive spread of a policy innovation (Stone 2001) and thus is focused on patterns, rather than the adoption or application of an institution in one place from another.
Entrepreneurship
This is an important variable positively influencing the potential for collective action Ostrom 2007; Ostrom 2009 ). The literature on collective action in natural resource management has made linkages to policy entrepreneurs and the importance of these actors (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005) . In the policy change field, entrepreneurs are advocates for an idea (Kingdon 1995; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Mintrom and Norman 2009) (Table 1) . Their passion about a subject leads them to build a network of contacts and 'social acuity' that act as sources of ideas (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Mintrom and Norman 2009) . They are willing to use their own expertize, skill and persistence to bring their ideas to fruition (Karch 2007) . They are actors who often work for several years to build support for their ideas before realizing success, and this preparatory work allows them to seize opportunities when the environment is favorable (Karch 2007; Mintrom and Norman 2009; also Schlager 2004) . The connection between entrepreneurship and building and using social capital is made by Ostrom (2009) , where a combination of entrepreneurial skills and respect lead to a stronger likelihood of selforganization. This connection is similarly identified in several other studies of leadership and entrepreneurship (e.g., Folke et al. 2005; Bodin and Crona 2008; George and Reed 2016) . Social capital is a term that refers the relationships among and between actors (Coleman 1990 ) and includes the aspects of trust, reciprocity, common rules, norms and sanctions, and networks (Pretty and Ward 2001) .
Entrepreneurs go by a range of names in the literature, from champion to change agent (Westley et al. 2013 ). In the institutional innovation literature, institutional entrepreneurs are described in a relatively similar manner as policy entrepreneurs, as not only introducing and leading an institutional innovation but also actively working to ensure that the innovation holds widespread appeal (Moore and Westley 2011; Rosen and Olsson 2013) . The role of institutional entrepreneur is likely held by several individuals rather than a single actor (Westley et al. 2013 ). Moore and Westley (2011) highlight four skills that are key for institutional entrepreneurs, though not all must be present for an entrepreneur to be successful: the ability to recognize patterns causing a rigidity trap (i.e., where innovation is needed but suppressed); the ability to build and broker relationships in a strategic way to achieve their goals; the ability to broker knowledge and resources to frame the innovation to make it accessible and engaging and to identify windows of opportunity in policy development; and, the ability to recharge the network when others become discouraged or tired.
Fear of marginalization
This mechanism from the policy change literature describes situations where actors have an incentive to coordinate their behavior with others or else risk becoming marginalized and their positions ignored (Häge 2013) (Table 1) . Fear of marginalization has been identified as a causal mechanism where consensus has been achieved among EU Council representatives. For example, Häge (2013) noted that the consensual decisions were actually an unintended byproduct of members' desires to form blocking coalitions in multilateral negotiations. Outside of this context, this causal mechanism has been used to explain strategic decisions to engage in civil war (Joshi 2013) , build coalitions among minority groups (Gruber 2004) , and engage in 'regionalism' in the Americas after the collapse of Kingdon (1995) Fear of marginalization Evidence that at least one actor that joined the coalition did so as a result of concern that their 'voice' would not be considered in decision-making in the future if they abstained from the coalition
Häge (2013) Environmental Management (2019) 63:16-31 communism (Hurrell 1992) . While this causal mechanism has not been explicitly identified in the natural resource governance literature, it is also relevant for the case study here.
Methods
Process tracing is a qualitative method focused on a single case study. It is used to identify causal mechanisms that link the context of a case to its outcome, providing the building blocks for theory development (Biesbroek et al. 2014) . Causal mechanisms were defined as including both an entity (n) and an activity (→) ( Table 1) , and as necessary for the process to proceed from context (called 'X') to outcome (called 'Y') (Eq. (1)) (Beach and Pedersen 2013) .
It is important to note that while Eq.
(1) suggests a linear relationship among causal mechanisms, in reality the relationships are non-linear and dynamic, further emphasizing the importance of considering the causal mechanisms as a whole (Beach and Pedersen 2013) . There are three variants of the method identified by Beach and Pedersen (2013) , in this case we use the 'explaining outcomes' variant, as we use a primarily inductive approach and draw upon the natural resource management and governance, policy change, and social innovation literatures (i.e., perceived severity of the problem emulation, entrepreneurship, fear of marginalization) in identifying sufficient casual mechanisms to explain the outcomes in this case.
Case Study
The Georgian Bay Biosphere Reserve (GBBR) is located along the eastern shores of Lake Huron, one of the North American Great Lakes. It is one of four UNESCO Biosphere Reserves under study in the larger project "Diagnosing Processes and Outcomes in Social-Ecological Systems: A Systematic, Cross-Case Comparison of Adaptive Co-Management Initiatives". Biosphere Reserves are nominated by national governments and must meet a minimum set of criteria to be designated: a core, protected area; a buffer zone around the core area; and a more actively developed transition area (or area of cooperation) (UNESCO 1996) . Within and across these three areas, Biosphere Reserves are sites where the goal of reconciling biodiversity conservation and sustainable development while maintaining cultural values can be tested and refined (UNESCO 1996) . The GBBR received its designation in 2005. It is situated within the largest fresh water archipelago in the world, in the area known as the 'Thirty thousand islands"; it also includes coastline, riparian areas and forested areas of the mainland (GBBR Inc. 2004 ). Considerable efforts have been put forth by governments and others to conserve areas along the coastline considered to hold exceptional biodiversity (GBBR Inc. 2004) . Biosphere Reserves share a common mandate for conservation, sustainable development and logistical support via education and research, and the GBBR has engaged in numerous activities in support of this mandate, including developing a conservation-oriented 'State of the Bay' ecosystem health report card, the educational Lessons-in-a-Backpack program for children, and encouraging sustainable development through the Biosphere Charter program for local businesses (GBBR n.d.).
Data Collection and Analysis
Primary data were collected through in-depth, semistructured interviews with the Biosphere Reserve comanagers and shorter, structured interviews with actors involved in Biosphere Reserve governance. These included individuals representing national, provincial and municipal governments, seasonal residents, permanent residents and business owners, non-governmental organizations, and one First Nations individual. Additional primary data were provided up request by Mr. Patrick Northey (P.N.), a key actor in the process of gaining the Biosphere Reserve designation. Secondary data were collected through literature searches (gray and scholarly), using materials that were provided directly by the co-managers upon request including the formal nomination document and other reports about the Biosphere Reserve, and archival documents (e-mail, meeting minutes, other documents and notes) from the coalition building process. The names of the key actor, P.N. and a key advisor, Dr. George Francis (G.F.) are used with permission. All other responses are kept confidential in line with the ethics approval from Brock University.
In the process tracing method, data are treated as individual observations, or pieces of evidence, rather than a dataset per se (Gerring 2007) and the more that unique pieces of evidence point to the same causal mechanism(s), the greater the confidence in that mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013) . The analysis draws heavily upon assumptions of how the world works and what the potential suite of options are in any given scenario as opposed to experimental design where a priori assumptions are minimized (Gerring 2007) . In undertaking process tracing, all evidence was first reviewed inductively, and in light of the potential causal mechanisms, beginning with those from the natural resource management and governance literature. Thereafter, it was clear to the authors that further causal mechanisms were required for the analysis, and additional bodies of literature were reviewed. The potential causal mechanisms described above (Table 1) represent the result of this process. Four causal mechanisms were identified at the conclusion of the evidence and literature reviews: perceived severity of the problem, emulation, entrepreneurship, and fear of marginalization. Upon completing the criteria for the four causal mechanisms, the evidence was reviewed again using the specific criteria required for each causal mechanism to exist as a checklist (Table 1) . Finally, each causal mechanism was tested for its relevance by considering whether the process would have proceeded without it using the evidence to refute or support this claim. For all four causal mechanisms, relevance was confirmed ( Fig. 1) and deemed sufficient to explain the outcomes of the case. At this point, no further literature was reviewed, as the causal mechanism selection process was complete.
Initial Conditions (X)
The information provided in this section relates to the conditions that were in place when the Biosphere Reserve nomination was first pursued, in the mid-1990s. Biosphere Reserves are places that are formally acknowledged by the United Nations' Man and the Biosphere Program as fulfilling three functions: biodiversity conservation, sustainable development, and logistical support (places for education, training and research to occur) (UNESCO 1996) . Biosphere Reserves must have a protected area (e.g., national or provincial park), a buffer zone with some protections, and an 'area of cooperation' which is generally where the majority of people live and work (UNESCO 1996) .
Ecological context
The GBBR region, in Ontario, Canada was, and is, considered the largest freshwater archipelago in the world (GBBR, Inc. 2004) . The region was comprised of coastline of Lake Huron with some open water and mainland. Its shoreline was comparatively undeveloped in relation to other regions nearby. Tourists visiting the area enjoyed swimming, boating, fishing and other water sports, as well as land-based recreation. The region contained national and provincial parks and the GBBR Inc. (2004) states it supported a high level of biodiversity, with over 100 species of animals and plants that are species at risk in Ontario or Canada. Prior to the 2013 State of the Bay report card created by The GBBR, together with other partners, there were no general reports of the ecological quality of the region. However, in the 2013 report card, water quality (as measured by total phosphorus concentration) improved from 1990s levels (Environment Canada n.d.) and was generally acceptable, as was wetland quality. Natural cover was considered good; however, fish health information was not available, nor were data related to large natural areas.
Community context
There was a relatively small permanent resident population that resided within the area of the GBBR of approximately 16,000 people. The majority of these were located within the community of Parry Sound. Unemployment in the region was high (12.9% in the 1996 Census) (Statistics Canada 1996) and poverty was a concern among the permanent residents (average family employment income per year of $44,924 in 1996) (Statistics Canada 1996) . The main economic drivers of the region at the time were tourism, retail, small business, and government employment. Tourism is still a noteworthy source of employment and income in the region, with a seasonal population of up to 25 times the permanent resident population of the region (GBBR Inc. 2004 ). The region was, and is, well-known for its recreational opportunities and natural beauty, with the 'thirty thousand islands' and many cottage properties on the islands, on the coastline of the Georgian Bay, and inland. The presence of such a large seasonal population also came with challenges. There was an ongoing conflict among four so-called "warring factions" (P.N. interview): cottagers, boaters, permanent residents, and Indigenous peoples regarding what each considered appropriate use of natural resources (Interviewee 1, P.N. interview). To clarify the terminology used in the region, 'cottagers' are those who own or use cottages (generally seasonal residences) and 'boaters' are those who live on board a boat, rather than those who use boats solely for recreation. Permanent residents are those who live in the region year-round and Indigenous peoples are those whose ancestors are the original inhabitants of North America. It is important to note that these four groups did not have a single voice (association) representing them, and so coalition building was not a 'simple' matter of bringing four single groups together, but rather a process of building support among multiple individuals in each group. Also noteworthy is that the original proponent for the Biosphere Reserve designation was a cottager active in a local association of cottagers.
History of the conflicts
One interviewee (2) described the conflict as an atmosphere of 'tangible animosity'. The main conflicts, as described by P.N. were focused on the cottagers and boaters. Cottagers were buying land along the shorelines and in bays traditionally used for anchorage for boaters. In turn, boaters were increasing in number in these areas (P.N., personal communication). Both groups felt that the other was infringing on their enjoyment of the area. Related to this was the lack of designated areas for anchorage and different rules for different users of the area (e.g., cottagers had to contain grey water, while boaters could dump theirs). Densities of boaters, cottagers and campers were seen to be 'getting out of hand' at peak periods and there was little enforcement of these groups due to provincial government cutbacks. Social pressures were building, court cases were occurring between the warring factions (see for example, Georgian Bay (Township) v. Skidmore, 1992, where use of boats for living quarters and overuse of docks were disputed, as well as Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources) v. Cote, 2005, where public lands were used for houseboat docking) and some were concerned that the animosity could turn violent given the low level of enforcement (Draft biosphere reserve proposal July 22, 1997). In addition to this, fishing, which some residents relied on for a living, was under threat due to over-harvesting, fishing out of season, and lack of enforcing fisheries regulations (Draft biosphere reserve proposal July 22, 1997).
Outcome (Y)
A coalition of the four warring factions was built by a key actor and other interested and motivated actors, and the nomination they put forward for consideration for a Biosphere Reserve designation was supported by many other community members and organizations (GBBR Inc. 2004 ). The nomination was also ultimately endorsed by the two governing bodies of the core areas of the Biosphere Reserve: the MNR (provincial government agency) and Parks Canada (federal government agency). The main hurdle in submitting the nomination document, according to P. N., was gaining the support of the MNR. In addition to requiring all four warring factions to come together around the nomination, the agency supported a parallel approach, the Great Lakes Heritage Coast, which borrowed heavily from the Biosphere Reserve objectives and P.N. and others were unsure of how the Biosphere Reserve concept could exist within or next to the Great Lakes Heritage Coast approach to governing the region, and the nomination process stalled for a couple of years. However, the Great Lakes Heritage Coast idea was ultimately abandoned by MNR which opened up a window of opportunity to again pursue an endorsement from them for the Biosphere Reserve nomination. A briefing document internal to the MNR and available through public archives noted that the MNR had been supportive of the Biosphere Reserve concept for many years and had positive working relationships with P.N. and others in the coalition. The information in the briefing document contradicted the stated experiences of P. N. in the process and archived materials detailing experiences in gaining support during that time.
Institutional context
Federal, provincial and municipal governments all hold authority in the region. As identified above, provincial government cutbacks were negatively affecting enforcement of users in the region. The provincial government was also cutting back in ecological oversight in action (e.g., in enforced protection of Environmentally Sensitive Areas). The Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) was apparently considering selling some of the crown (government-owned) land in the region, which created concerns about the effectiveness of land and water use planning in the future (Meeting minutes, May 20, 1997) .
At the municipal level, there was great uncertainty about jurisdictional borders. Amalgamations and mergers among municipalities and districts were being considered and there was much discussion and debate about what various configurations would mean for the region. In the case of the region being considered by interested and motivated individuals for a Biosphere Reserve designation (mainly coastal), the main concern was around the power held by inland, more densely populated municipalities and how that would influence decision-making around ecological issues.
The governmental context is also important for this case because Biosphere Reserve nominations require the endorsement of those who manage the core protected areas in the region under nomination. In this case, that included provincial (MNR) and federal (Parks Canada) governments. Early on in the nomination process, it was clear to the proponents of the Biosphere Reserve nomination that the MNR would not endorse a nomination that did not include all key stakeholders (i.e., warring factions) and so a coalition to promote the Biosphere Reserve concept would require bringing together these groups with a history of conflict.
At several points throughout the coalition building process, materials promoting the Biosphere Reserve concept made references to the multiple levels of authority for the region and fragmentation that resulted. The Biosphere Reserve designation was identified by proponents as a potential mechanism to 'download' authority for water use planning in particular to a local/regional level.
Causal Mechanisms: Moving from Conflict to Coalition
Each of the potential causal mechanisms is described, in turn, drawing upon evidence collected from the case study and interpreted in relation to the mechanism's contribution to the outcome, drawing upon the literature to support this interpretation and extend it. The evidence is presented in a summary table (Table 2) for each causal mechanism, with information about the entities that enacted each mechanism and the specific actions taken in line with requirements for identifying relevant causal mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen 2013) .
Perceived severity of the problem P.N. noted that bringing the four warring factions together was a key motivation for pursuing the Biosphere Reserve designation. He perceived the problem as a critical one for maintaining the region's 'Georgian Bay feeling'. As early as 1997, it is clear from the archival documents (i.e., the very first planning documents, meeting agendas, proposal drafts, prepared materials to build support in the community for a Biosphere Reserve) that P.N. used the perceived severity of the problems in the region, referencing political, economic, population and ecological issues impacting the region to gain support for the Biosphere Reserve concept. In these documents there are also statements about the probable outcomes if the Biosphere Reserve designation is not pursued, including accelerated ecological and economic degradation, as well as escalating conflicts among users. However, this causal mechanism can only be identified as important for the process (moving from X to Y) as a primary motivation for P.N. to instigate the Biosphere Reserve nomination process (Table 2) ; its influence at later stages cannot be verified with the evidence available in the case.
Many in the region perceived the problems as severe, with evidence from interviews (P.N.) and documents (promotional materials from all stages of efforts to organize the Biosphere Reserve nomination and recruit community members). This causal mechanism exhibits linkages with the attributes of an entrepreneur, as they tend to have an ability to identify when a system requires innovation but is suppressed (Moore and Westley 2011) . The perceived severity of the problem can be paired with a perceived inability of existing institutions to address the problem (Lubell et al. 2002) . This was explicitly identified as one of the reasons for pursuing a Biosphere Reserve designation, as evidenced by an early mission statement "To create an internationally recognized entity which recognizes the Littoral zone as a unity, rather than as a series of appendages to inland municipal jurisdictions" (referring to the belief that all levels of government ignore that unity) (July 22, 1997 draft proposal sent to G.F.).
'Institutional' emulation
In 1996, P.N. attended a workshop "The US Canada Great Lakes Islands Workshop" and met G.F. there. He indicated that he had been searching for an organizational framework for the Georgian Bay for several years at that time, and that G.F. was instrumental in identifying the Biosphere Reserve concept as appropriate for the region (P.N., personal communication). P.N. saw it as a way to potentially find common ground among the four warring factions in Georgian Bay that he believed existed (expressed in archived personal communication from P.N.). In an email from G.F. to a colleague, he states: "I've been talking to [P.N.] …he was taken by the biosphere reserve idea, and wants to see how to pursue it." (archived email, September 5, 1996). G.F. became an important advisor during the coalition building stage to the key actor. The archived notes from the coalition building process, interviews with several individuals in the GBBR and the nomination document (GBBR Inc. 2004 ) all indicate the important role that both P.N. and G.F. played in bringing the Biosphere Reserve concept to fruition (Table  2) . However, institutional emulation as a causal mechanism for coalition building played a particularly important role in bringing the idea of a Biosphere Reserve, and a coalition to support it, to life in the Georgian Bay region.
The specific catalysts for emulation from P.N. were the perceived severity of the problem, in terms of the political, economic and social issues plaguing the region (Meeting agenda, May 20, 1997, as well as archived documents including personal communication between P. N. and G.F., early drafts of the nomination document and promotional materials prepared for the region); as well as the dual mandate of Biosphere Reserves for biodiversity conservation and sustainable development and the lack of any formal power by Biosphere Reserves, as governments could support it and not be threatened by it (P.N., personal communication). The severity of the problem was at the fore of many of the archival documents, especially those prior to 2000 in the early formative stages of the coalition. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identify dissatisfaction with the status quo as a catalyst for voluntary emulation, which is certainly related to the perceived severity of the problem. Other potential catalysts, such as perceived success of the arrangement in other places (Karch 2007) and similarities between the target region and regions where the arrangement has been implemented (Karch 2007) have very limited to no evidence to support them in this case.
This causal mechanism has important linkages to research by Lubell and others (e.g., Lubell et al. 2002; ) that the perception that an institutional arrangement will work makes actors more likely to engage in it. It is an underlying reason why emulation occurred. In this case, it is clear from archival and interview evidence that P.N., along with others in the region, believed that the BR concept would be a viable way to engage in collective action and that G.F., who introduced this concept to him, confirmed this belief and supported it throughout the process of moving from context (X) to outcome (Y). 
Institutional entrepreneurship
This mechanism was exerted throughout the 7-year process of coalition building and evidence of its influences on the ultimate outcome (Y) is provided here. Because of its prevalence throughout the process (i.e., over a long period of time with multiple influences, see Fig. 1 ), more detail is provided in this section than in the others. P.N. first approached the Georgian Bay Association, with whom he worked, and indicated that they provided funding and support throughout the process (P.N., personal communication). P.N. began working on documents to promote the Biosphere Reserve idea to foundations for funding very early on in the process (spring, 1997) in his free time and enlisted others (not from the warring factions) from his network to assist with them, as well as his advisor, G. F. The document illustrated P.N.'s ability to strategize and effectively communicate his proposed idea. It explained current issues in the region with respect to the economy, ecological conditions and further threats to both. It explained the purpose of the Biosphere Reserve in the context of these issues, as a governing body to alleviate jurisdictional fragmentation, one that would provide land and water use plans to conserve the region and mitigate tensions among users and unify the area, and one that would build ecotourism to stem the economic depression in some areas. It also highlighted what might happen if no action was taken. As a result of his efforts, two foundations provided funds to undertake the work required to prepare the nomination. In the fall of 1997, efforts to build the coalition began in earnest by P.N. He exploited his strong network, including municipal officials, the federal government (Parks Canada) and the provincial government (MNR). Three municipal officials supported the idea and created a working group to develop a sustainable economic development plan in line with the nomination. Later, additional municipalities would be added as a result of P.N. using his network connections to others in the community that had built relationships with officials and could connect with them on a personal level to solicit their support. P.N., along with others in his network, were able to organize a coordinated effort to conduct an ecological inventory of the region with Parks Canada, though the agency did not endorse the Biosphere Reserve nomination idea at this point. Finally, P.N. made contact with a network connection in MNR, as a result of the individual attending a presentation by P.N. about the concept, and who expressed interest in the idea (P.N., personal communication). P. N. thereafter planned to attend a workshop hosted by MNR for citizen feedback on a program called "Living Legacy" which the key actor identified as an opportunity to 'pitch' the Biosphere Reserve idea. P.N. also used strategic means to build support for the Biosphere Reserve idea. He highlighted three goals for coalition building: persuade MNR to join the coalition and develop a workshop to expand stakeholder involvement to avoid this appearing to be a 'cottager' only initiative. The second goal was to establish a newsletter to provide updates to stakeholders. The third goal focused on building credibility by using experts in the development of materials and in presenting the idea to stakeholders (e.g., the cottager community).
In 1998, P.N. had gained the support of most of the cottager community, as well as several municipalities (permanent residents) and started to make plans to connect with Indigenous peoples and boaters. Communication with a "key Aboriginal Chief" resulted in a delay in any further communication with Indigenous communities, as the Chief indicated that they were only interested in being included in dialog once the plan was closer to reality. In regard to gaining the support of the boaters (the group he considered the most difficult to bring into the coalition), P.N. planned to meet with a trust organization to help enable boaters to ensure anchorage rights in one area. He considered this a good way to get them talking about their future without having cottagers as the focal point of the discussion and that it might be a critical first step to alleviating conflict among the two groups. One year later, P.N. connected with two members of the boating community about the Biosphere Reserve idea and they suggested meeting to talk about opportunities to work together. Here, he used the concept of the 'Georgian Bay feeling' to highlight shared values (P.N., personal communication). This built the relationship required to bring some members of the boating community into the coalition, but others remained reluctant. A similar strategy was found in the process of establishing an Ecomuseum in what later became the biosphere reserve Kristianstads Vattenrike in Sweden. Here,"sponsors and other collaborators were approached individually and were given presentations on whichever aspect of the project was deemed to be appealing to them and their specific interests" (Olsson et al. 2004a, p. 13 ). In Hahn et al. (2006) , the key actor in Kristianstads Vattenrike explained that you need to engage with people individually before you bring them all into the same room, in order to build the trust and understanding needed to overcome conflict.
Between the period of mid-1999 and late 2001 P.N. engaged the MNR at least three times to endeavor to gain support for the Biosphere Reserve. These attempts did not yield success as the MNR was focused on its Living Legacy initiative which shared very similar objectives to the Biosphere Reserve proposal. P.N. decided to wait for an opportunity to continue to push for Biosphere Reserve support from MNR. During this period P.N. also identified a window of opportunity to bring more boaters into the coalition, as cottages were starting to intrude on traditional places for anchorage and the Biosphere Reserve proposal included suggested changes to regulatory powers from the current federal powers shifted to coastal jurisdictions which he believed the boaters would agree with.
In late 2003, P.N. engaged individuals in his network again to recruit volunteers to organize a workshop for permanent residents to learn about the Biosphere Reserve designation and the dispel myths and concerns. These individuals, in turn, drew upon their networks to bring knowledgeable speakers into in the community to speak about and promote the Biosphere Reserve concept. Some stakeholders who attended that meeting are still on the board (Interviewee 4 and 5) and made a decision at the meeting, or shortly thereafter, to become a part of the coalition.
Also during this time period, P.N. received a phone call from a contact in the MNR. There had been a recent change in government and the new party in power had made a decision not to pursue the Living Legacy/Great Lakes Heritage Coast program. P.N.'s contact, a "dynamic" assistant to the minister in the MNR, had endorsed the Biosphere Reserve idea at a recent meeting he was invited to attend where P.N. explained "the assistant turned to my friend and said, 'you want this, you really like this project don't you?' and he said, 'yeah, we really ought to be supporting this' and he [the assistant] looked with a smile and said, 'I agree. I am going to get the minister to sign off on it.'" (P.N. interview and personal communication), and as a result, he assisted in opening a window of opportunity to reengage with MNR about support for the nomination. It was ultimately endorsed.
The final group from the original four warring factions that had yet to be included in the coalition were the Indigenous communities. P.N. had a contact in his network who was of Indigenous background and was enthusiastic about the idea. This individual brought key people in (as a working group) to: (1) convince the MNR that all key stakeholders were represented in the coalition and nomination in order to gain their support for it, and (2) build support within Indigenous communities in the region for the Biosphere Reserve nomination. While the Indigenous communities never did formally support the idea, P.N.'s contact was certain that they would not oppose it (P.N., personal communication).
During the entire process of building the coalition, P.N. exhibited several attributes that resulted in the success of building a coalition among all warring factions: passion and perseverance over a long period of time and despite some major hurdles including political processes (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996) ; strategic thinker-how to communicate idea to various groups and when to pitch it to them; and, understands the importance of networks and social capital.
These are all classic attributes of a policy/institutional entrepreneur that were artfully applied as needed by P.N. What is particularly interesting to note is that he relied upon other entrepreneurs to build support within their networks (e.g., Indigenous contact built support with other Indigenous communities, contact in the publicity industry used his network to create buy-in from municipalities). So, P.N. not only leveraged his network, but also their networks ( Table 2) .
Fear of marginalization
Near the end of the coalition building process in 2003, a local business owner and boater (Interviewee 5) attended the workshop held for permanent residents to explain the Biosphere Reserve designation, dispel myths about negative impacts on businesses from the designation and recruit community members to join the effort which had been previously missing from the coalition (Interviewee 1; archival material) and were considered important for the success of the coalition. After attending the workshop, Interviewee 5 acknowledged that it was in his best interest to be included in the coalition. He was fearful that other the voices of the other groups in the coalition would be heard but his would not if he did not join (Table 2 ). That is, that the group was becoming strong enough to be the primary 'voice' in the region and he saw strong representation by cottagers (another warring faction) which worried him. "Quite frankly some of us as the local residents and more the recreational boating community were quite concerned that this was something to control something that was and still is public property. There was concern that the cottage community would take over and limit access and control… that was one of the reasons I got involved" (Interviewee 5). His ultimate motivation for joining the coalition was twofold: (1) to be sure that his interests as a local business owner and boater were represented, and (2) to preserve the region for future generations (Interviewee 5). This is one instance of a novel mechanism for the context, identified from primary interview data. Thus, although the fear of marginalization mechanism is not identified from multiple sources, it represents a motivation for a stakeholder from an important group (local resident/boater) to join the coalition. The evidence available in this case is not sufficient to confirm this mechanism was imperative to a successful coalition, however, the finding represents an initial indication that fear of marginalization may play an important role in later stages of coalition building in selforganized natural resource governance. The 'fear of marginalization' mechanism has been identified in other fields and has been credited as an explanation in a range of situations, from the strategic alliances of marginalized groups and nations (e.g., Gruber 2004; Häge 2013) to barriers to success (e.g., Sealey-Ruiz 2013). However, this causal mechanism has not been identified in the collective action literature in relation to natural resource governance to date.
Final Notes About the Case Study
It is important to note that, while representatives from the four warring factions: cottagers, boaters, permanent residents, and Indigenous peoples created a coalition around the Biosphere Reserve nomination for the Georgian Bay region, the conflicts were not resolved. Despite enduring conflict, the GBBR is in its 13th year and is achieving social and ecological outcomes (Armitage et al. 2017; Plummer et al. 2017a, b) . Continued, self-organized activity in the Biosphere Reserve persists as the entrepreneur has pulled back from a leadership position. However, the participation of Indigenous peoples in the governance of the Biosphere Reserve was not sustained over time and has been an ongoing goal of those managing the Biosphere Reserve. Zurba (2014) provides an overview of the long history and legacy of a lack of engagement of Indigenous peoples in Canada, that contribute to deep social divisions, and offers a framework to engage them in collaborative decision making for natural resources. McAvoy et al. (2003) highlight the differences in worldview between Indigenous and nonIndigenous peoples, including differences in how attachment to place is felt and expressed, which may have influenced involvement by Indigenous participants in Georgian Bay. Ernstson et al. (2008) concluded that the same structures that enable self-organized governance can also constrain it through the peripheral position of some groups during the formative process. In the case of Georgian Bay, it appears that P.N. attempted to engage Indigenous individuals early in the process but they declined involvement. This may have created a legacy of a peripheral position for Indigenous peoples in Biosphere Reserve governance.
Discussion
The case of coalition-building under conflict in the Georgian Bay region provided an opportunity to understand the causal mechanisms underlying the process. We drew from several distinct, but related, literatures with consistent underlying assumptions to identify potential causal mechanisms and test them in the case. Findings from this study highlight several considerations about how causal mechanisms operate, and hold direct relevance to the literature upon which they draw; in particular, natural resource management and governance (and sub-field of collective action).
Causal Mechanisms and How they Operate
Three of the causal mechanisms were internal to the coalition building process and shouldered in large part by the key actor and his network: perceived severity of the problem, institutional emulation and institutional entrepreneurship ( Table 2) . As a result, there are clear interconnections identified among these three causal mechanisms: the entrepreneurial attributes of P.N. created, at least in part, the conditions to perceive the problem as severe and a greater chance of attempting emulation as a result of his network connections. The fourth mechanism was an external response to the process, the fear that nonparticipation in the coalition would create an inability to influence decision making about the region in the future. As such, it stands alone but was reliant on the success of the coalition up to a threshold where the fear of marginalization became great enough to induce action. Connections could be made here to the concept of cost-benefit analysis made in the perceived severity of the problem (Olson 1965; , as individuals choosing to join the coalition as a result of the fear of marginalization must perceive the benefits of joining to be greater than the cost of not joining (or that their marginal benefit at some point exceeds the marginal cost of joining [Olson 1965] ). While there is no explicit statement in the evidence supporting this causal mechanism, we suggest that the evidence we draw on (above) implies that this calculation may have been implicitly undertaken by at least one participant. A departure from the concept of cost-benefit analysis in this case, however, is that the 'problem' is likely a combination of marginalization and the original problems that prompted self-organization in the first place.
Developing a Deeper (and Different) Understanding of Causal Mechanisms from Natural Resource Management and Governance and Collective Action
The perceived severity of the problem was a critical factor for engaging actors in the coalition in its early days. This causal mechanism, as conceived by Lubell et al. (2002) , is measured at the level of the region under (potential) governance and reflects the overall potential that a partnership will form. However, in this case, these perceptions appeared to be important in terms of spurring one individual-the entrepreneur-to seek out a potential solution to the problem. Thus, it was not a matter of a collective measure of several indicators of problem severity (Lubell et al. 2002) , but rather it acted as a motivator for the individual, the advisor, and a few early adopters.
This study also confirms what we know about the importance of an entrepreneur, one who perseveres and is highly networked, to the success of self-organized natural resource governance (Folke et al. 2005; Olsson et al. 2004b ). However, it also highlights that the role of entrepreneur was held by not just one champion of an idea, but that there were several individuals working alongside the key actor that facilitated coalition-building within their respective networks. Entrepreneurs are increasingly identified as multiple individuals that are influential in a single case (e.g., Biggs et al. 2010; Westley et al. 2013; cf. Olsson et al. 2004a ). Here, we confirm the role of multiple dedicated, connected, influential entrepreneurs in moving from conflict to coalition. These individuals drew upon two critical features of entrepreneurs. The first of these is trust, which reduces transaction costs among people and facilitates cooperation (Pretty and Ward 2001; Fulmer and Gelfand 2012) . Trust was beneficial in the key actor engaging others to build the coalition among their networks. The second was networks, which manifested as both local connections between P.N. (and other trusted actors in his network) and others in the region, as well as connections to external organizations, specifically government agencies which facilitated discussions with these agencies (Pretty and Ward 2001; Bodin and Crona 2008) .
A New Causal Mechanism in Self-organization for Coalition-building
The role that fear of marginalization plays in coalition development and self-organization has not been developed in the context of natural resource governance. It is a negative causal mechanism and challenges the notion that coalitions are necessarily built of individuals who wish to advance a common cause (cf. Geels 2004). It emphasizes Steins and Edwards (1999) insight that pursuit of individual interests, even though those interests may be different, can lead to collective action. While the evidence for this causal mechanism is less robust than for the others-only one respondent provided evidence of this casual mechanismrecognizing the fear of marginalization as a valid reason for individuals to engage in natural resource management and governance arrangements may assist leaders in preparing for and addressing ongoing conflict. Understanding that there are additional causal mechanisms or reasons for engaging in self-organization will also advance the natural resource management, governance, and collective action literature, building a better understanding of the range of potential reasons why self-organization under conflict occurs.
Conclusions
There has been much attention paid to how self-organized coalitions operate and the importance of collaboration in the natural resource management and governance literature (Folke et al. 2002 (Folke et al. , 2005 Armitage et al. 2009; Butler et al. 2015) , including in relation to conflict (Buckles 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Daniels and Walker 2001) . However, significantly less attention has been directed to how self-organization occurs and coalitions develop. This case study, using a process tracing methodology, followed the formation of a self-organized coalition focused on bringing together diverse stakeholders in the Georgian Bay region for a Biosphere Reserve nomination. Four causal mechanisms that held strong potential for their role in the case were identified from the fields of natural resource management and governance, policy change and social innovation and were all confirmed: perceived severity of the problem, institutional emulation, institutional entrepreneurship, and fear of marginalization.
The review of the natural resource management and governance literature (including collective action for this purpose) yielded a long list of potential factors that may have been relevant to the case (e.g., Lubell et al. 2002; Schlager 2004; Ostrom 2007 Ostrom , 2009 ). However, this list was ultimately insufficient to explain the progression of self-organization in the case of the biosphere reserve nomination in the Georgian Bay region. An important consideration here is that this case is somewhat different in terms of its scope than those in the literature drawn upon, in that biosphere reserves have specific requirements to be eligible for nomination: the physical scope must include a protected area, a buffer zone and a zone of cooperation (UNESCO 1996) . The scope of participation was also potentially more rigid than in many other cases, where the participation of certain groups was a prerequisite for government endorsement of the nomination to biosphere reserve status.
In drawing from the natural resource management and governance literature, as well as other, related literatures (policy change and social innovation), a suite of causal mechanisms was identified that were sufficient to explain the outcome of self-organization under a moderate level of conflict (i.e., ongoing conflict among users that resulted in ecosystem mistreatment and legal action). This highlights the benefit of moving beyond disciplinary boundaries, but also a limitation of the study. The authors brought a particular perspective to this work, and engaged in an iterative process of inductive and deductive analysis of the evidence and identified factors. Process tracing is a technique that relies on the analyst's collection of evidence and interpretation of it, both in light of knowledge of the case and in light of the literature. While we identified a suite of causal mechanisms that sufficiently explained the outcome, it is not necessarily the only explanation (Beach and Pedersen 2013) . This study holds both scholarly and applied relevance. It illuminates the gap in knowledge around causal mechanisms, and identifies a novel causal mechanism: fear of marginalization. As a previously undefined causal mechanism for collaboration in natural resource management and governance, several questions emerge about the role that the fear of marginalization may play: How prevalent is it as a causal mechanism? What are the implications of the fear of marginalization as a causal mechanism for coalition building over time, that is, past the stage where the coalition is built to when it functions as a natural resource governance arrangement? Does the fear of marginalization abate over time or does it persist? Answers to these questions will provide further insights useful for natural resource management and governance scholarship and practice. A second contribution of this work is the insights into how these causal mechanisms operate. In particular, (1) how factors identified in the literature are utilized and interpreted as causal mechanisms; and, (2) the duration and timing of causal mechanism influence (i.e., most exert influence at a particular point in time while one -institutional entrepreneurship-exhibited extended influence throughout the process [ Fig. 1]) . From a practice and policy perspective, efforts to engage others in coalitionbuilding may consider the causal mechanisms identified here in planning and to anticipate what will motivate others, even those in conflict, to engage. However, the results of this single case study are context specific and broader lessons cannot yet be drawn.
Future research directions include examining additional cases of moving from conflict to coalition to build an understanding of the potential prevalence of these causal mechanisms. In particular, more research is needed to understand the importance of the fear of marginalization in other cases as the evidence provided for this causal mechanism rests was less robust than the others. Further research to better elucidate how factors identified as potentially important for self-organization and policy change operate as causal mechanisms is an important next step (following Agrawal's (2001) call for causal mechanism research), and will support a richer picture of the 'how' of these factors, as well as the importance of the causal mechanisms across different contexts.
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